The Beacon did an excellent job of tabulating the data on the March 5 mayoral primary and reporting it in graphics. The numbers tell the story in black and white. Despite his decisive margin of victory, 54 percent to 44 percent, the white incumbent Mayor Francis G. Slay beat his black challenger aldermanic President Lewis Reed in only one majority-black ward, the 6th Ward. Embarrassingly for Reed, this is his home ward.
Of the five wards that showed the strongest support for Slay – the 16th ward (85 percent), 23rd Ward (83.6 percent), 10th Ward (81 percent), 12th Ward (80.2 percent) and 24th Ward (77.7 percent) – four of those wards are also the whitest wards in the city.
Of the five wards that showed the strongest support for Reed – the 4th Ward (80.6 percent), 2nd Ward (79.6 percent), 21st Ward (79.2 percent), 27th Ward (77.9 percent) and 1st Ward (76.8 percent) – four of those wards are also the blackest wards in the city.
That said, Clay’s field operation that went to work with Slay seems to have made some difference. In an election where everyone expected race would be a critical factor, they set their goals at getting 20 percent for Slay in majority-black wards, knowing that would provide the margin of victory. They succeeded in all but four wards, Slay’s weakest wards in the city during this cycle: the 4th Ward, where Slay performed the worst with 17.5 percent; the 27th Ward (18.8 percent Slay); the 2nd Ward (19 percent Slay); and the 21st Ward (19.2 percent Slay).
Of course, the Reed campaign faced the same challenge with the same strategy, with similar results. Reed won at least 20 percent in every majority-white ward except for four: the 16th Ward, where Reed performed the worst (14.5 percent); the Slay family’s home 23rd Ward (15.7 percent for Reed); the 10th Ward (18.2 percent for Reed); and the 12th Ward (19.2 percent for Reed).
A critical difference was turnout in the wards where the respective candidates were dominant. In three of the four wards where Slay kept Reed under 20 percent, voter turnout was over 30 percent – and turnout citywide was highest overall in the ward where Slay was strongest, the 16th Ward (35 percent turnout, 85 percent for Slay).
In Reed’s four strongest wards, the highest turnout was only 23.9 percent (21st Ward). In Reed’s other three strongest wards, voter turnout was below the already low citywide average of 22 percent. That alone killed his campaign.
Base messaging
The clear conclusion is that Slay motivated his base against Reed much better than Reed motivated his base against Slay. Slay had five times more campaign funds than Reed, with $3.5 million; but with $760,000 raised, Reed could hardly cry poverty. He had enough money to win against a three-term incumbent who had antagonized the city’s black plurality as well as some high-voting sectors of his base, such as public sector employees.
Clay could claim a victory in helping to neutralize Reed’s base, and presumably he has earned some bargaining leverage with the Mayor’s Office. Whether or not he has incurred any lasting damage to his brand, with his strong embrace of Slay, is yet to be determined.
It’s also clear that the racially polarizing messages in this election benefitted Slay overall. Some of the messages pushed by the Reed campaign – and by activist sectors of the community apparently operating independently of Reed – clearly backfired.
“A video Reed disowned almost a week after it appeared questioned the mayor’s sexuality,” Lana Stein noted in The Beacon. “There was ‘Slayve’ mayor and his black lackey. Finally, an ad in The American and replicated on door hangers showed Malcolm X, Barack Obama, and Martin Luther King Jr. and asked whom they would vote for. A separate committee paid for the door hangers but they were distributed along with Reed GOTV hangers. These appeared in integrated neighborhoods but, in at least one case, seven hours after the polls had opened.”
Richard Callow, who managed Slay’s campaign, pushed Terry Artis’ anti-Slay ‘Slayve’ message and movie much harder than Artis did himself and certainly much, much harder than the Reed campaign did. The Republican-leaning white voters in the city’s far southwestern wards seem to have been more energized against Reed for this “plantation politics” message than Reed’s base was energized on his behalf.
However, it’s understandable if Reed felt the need to embrace black activist support to engage the black base, even if some of their tactics seemed to work against him overall. Not only is Reed not from North St. Louis, he is not from St. Louis at all. He is actually a unique black citywide politician in St. Louis in that he emerged from none of the traditional local, civic or political establishments. Clay’s willingness to risk his own credibility with his base to back Slay must be seen in this context, as Reed owes his rise to a new, diverse, but uncertain coalition. In helping Slay win, Clay also put out a fire that he could have found climbing up his own leg a few election cycles from now.
St. Louis does have elected – and electable – black officials with a stronger base in the black community, as well as crossover appeal, who could have posed a more damaging threat to Slay. As a Clay operative who worked behind enemy lines for Slay in North City told the EYE, “A Terry Kennedy or Michael McMillan could have taken Slay this time.” But Kennedy does not appear to have citywide ambitions, and McMillan is effectively retired from the political side of politics, content for the moment to competently manage the License Collector’s Office while he awaits his next move.
Crushed in the Corridor
But there is a different and more damning lesson for Reed lurking in the numbers, and that is how badly Slay beat him in the diverse Central Corridor. Slay won wards 6, 17, 7 and 8 – some of them by devastating margins, winning nearly 70 percent of the votes in wards 7 and 8. That, more than anywhere, is where Reed lost this election.
Given that the Central Corridor has the city’s most diverse neighborhoods where race is increasingly not a total indicator of how people vote, it is clear that Reed did not offer a compelling message. Reed provided a searing critique of Slay but did not offer convincing evidence that he was a better alternative and that he represented a change in direction for the city, based upon things he has accomplished during his own already extensive tenure in public life.
Time and again, when given his chance to deliver a single knock-out message, Reed slammed Slay on crime. No one who lives in the city is comfortable with the city’s crime crisis, but the swing message voters who come out in a municipal primary are not nearly as uninformed as the Reed campaign seemed to assume they are. In fact, a St. Louis mayor has not managed the city’s police department since the Civil War. Reed was clinging to a message that might have won the office of mayor in the early 1860s, but in 2013 this message was of much less consequence to voters.
The EYE would go further to suggest that, having missed this opportunity, Lewis Reed’s prospects for higher office have suffered a setback. Since he missed this opportunity, and if he really wants to move Slay out of the way as badly as he says, he might want to help someone else take a chance next time.
